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Abstract: This study investigates the relationship between household credit and banking stabil-
ity in Malaysia using a sample of  37 commercial banks spanning the period from 2008 to 2015. 
In analyzing household credit’s influence on the Malaysian banking sector’s stability, household 
credit was categorized into two components, namely mortgage and consumer credit. The Bank-
ing Stability Index (BSI) for each bank is constructed using 15 bank-specific variables and some 
macro-economic variables. The determinants of  the BSI are estimated using a static panel data 
technique. The fixed-effects regression results showed a statistically significant negative relation-
ship between both forms of  household credit (mortgage credit and consumer credit) upon the 
banking sector’s stability. The finding signals that understanding the link between household 
credit and the Bank Stability Index is crucial to the policymakers and the banks’ management in 
closely monitoring household credit, particularly mortgage and consumer credit.
Keywords: household credit; household debt to GDP; mortgage credit; consumer credit; bank-
ing stability; index.
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Introduction
Household credit has gained increasing 
importance in both developed and develop-
ing countries. In 2007, more than 40% of  
total bank lending in many countries went 
to household credit (Beck, Büyükkarabacak 
& Valey 2012). This is particularly true for 
Malaysia, where household credit comprised 
55% of  total bank lending in 2015 (BNM 
2015). Household credit has attracted many 
countries’ attention and has emerged as 
an essential research topic (Rinaldi & San-
chis-Arellano 2006; Abid & Zouari-ghorbel 
2012; Debelle 2004; Charpe & Flaschel 2013). 
Increased household lending has helped im-
prove the housing market (Debelle 2004) and 
stimulated consumption (Kim et al., 2014). In 
these respects, it has contributed to enhanc-
ing the macro-economic situation regarding 
business activity and employment trends. 
However, a certain level of  household credit 
may start to affect the overall macro-econom-
ic outcomes. This was confirmed by Sassi 
and Gasmi (2014), who empirically assessed 
the effects of  business credit and household 
credit on economic growth, finding that busi-
ness credit boosts economic growth while 
household credit dampens economic growth. 
In a similar study, Beck et al., (2012) found 
that business lending enhances economic 
growth and reduces income inequality, while 
household lending has no statistically signifi-
cant economic growth effect.
Rapid growth in household credit affects 
not only economic growth but also banking 
stability. This is illustrated by the fact that 
the substantial increase in household cred-
it, such as the Korean credit card crisis of  
2003 (Kang & Ma 2009), the US subprime 
mortgage crisis of  2007 to 2009 (Sengup-
ta 2014), and the European sovereign debt 
crisis in 2010 have significantly had a bigger 
impact on the banking industry, which led to 
spillover effects on the entire economy and 
the financial intermediaries (Angelopoulou, 
Balfoussia & Gibson 2014; Agnello & Sousa 
2012). Household credit represents a large 
proportion of  a bank’s balance sheet, and 
any changes will increase the risks to a bank’s 
assets. A study by Foos et al., (2010) found 
that credit expansion reduced banks’ capital 
and profitability. Additionally, when borrow-
ers default on repayments, the bank must 
make unexpected payments, affecting bank 
liquidity (Charpe & Flaschel 2013). Another 
concern is the exposure of  banking institu-
tions to the household sector during times 
of  financial stress. The household sector is 
susceptible to inflation, unemployment, and 
changes in income and interest rates (Na-
kornthab 2010), leading to increases in the 
fragility of  the banking sector (Charpe & 
Flaschel 2013).
Empirical findings by Cecchetti, Mo-
hanty, and Zampolli (2011) suggest that 
the threshold for household debt to GDP 
should be no more than 85%. However, at 
88.4%, Malaysia has surpassed this recom-
mended threshold, potentially leading to 
damaging effects (Cecchetti et al., 2011). 
This raises concerns about the potential im-
plications for increased household credit on 
the stability of  the banking sector. Further, 
in comparison with other countries such as 
Indonesia (16.8%), the Philippines (35%), 
China    (39.5%), Hong Kong (67.1%), Singa-
pore  (72%),  Taiwan  (83%), Thailand (84%) 
and South Korea (88.4%), household debt to 
GDP in Malaysia is among the highest in Asia 
(World Bank 2015). Moreover, research con-
cerning household credit and banking stabil-
ity is still limited (Freitakas & Mendelsonas 
2015), particularly for developing countries 
such as Malaysia (Mokhtar & Ismail 2013). 
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The current study focuses on banking 
stability for two reasons. First, the banking 
sector represents the largest financial system 
component, accounting for approximately 
67% of  its total assets (BNM 2016). There-
fore, any risks incurred in the banking sector 
will affect the entire financial system (Crock-
ett et al., 1996; Cevik, Dibooglu & Kenc 
2016). Moreover, it is the only finance source 
in developing countries (Nisar et al., 2015). 
Second, this study was motivated by ear-
lier studies focusing on total credit growth, 
including credit in the household and busi-
ness sectors (Amador et al., 2013; Foos et al., 
2010; Igan & Pinheiro 2011; Baradwaj et al., 
2015; Kashif, Iftikhar & Iftikhar 2016; Koong 
et al., 2017). However, this study focused 
solely on the ratio of  household credit to to-
tal loans because, Büyükkarabacak, Neven T. 
Valev (2010) and Demirgüc-Kunt and Detra-
giache (1998) put forward an argument that 
a high level of  household credit has been 
an essential predictor of  banking instability. 
Meanwhile, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), 
have shown that rapid credit growth is the 
leading indicator of  banking instability in a 
12-month horizon. Indeed, a report from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2004) 
indicated that about 75% of  credit growth 
in emerging markets end in banking fragility. 
Furthermore, in contrast with other South-
east Asian Central Bank member countries, 
Malaysia exceeded the 50% household cred-
it threshold (Nakornthab 2010). Business 
loans were excluded in this study to provide 
in-depth analysis since the composition of  
banks’ portfolios has changed substantially 
over time, with household credit currently 
exceeding the business credit volume (BNM 
2016). Moreover, household credit is increas-
ing faster than GDP growth (e.g., nomi-
nal GDP at 7.5%, household credit at 11% 
(BNM 2015), and household loans represent 
the largest portion of  banking institutions 
debt, rather than business loans. 
This study’s main objective was to pro-
vide empirical evidence of  household credit’s 
influence on banking stability. In achieving 
this objective, this study proposed an index-
ing system to measure banking stability to 
explain the relationship between household 
credit and the Malaysian banking sector. 
Previous studies have applied many dif-
ferent approaches to gauge the level of  sta-
bility in banking sectors. Among them are 
stress testing (Borio, Drehmann & Tsatsa-
ronis 2014; Jakubík & Heřmánek 2008), 
z-score (Cihák & Hesse 2007, 2010; Uhde & 
Heimeshoff  2009), and Capital adequancy, 
Assets, Management capability, Earnings and 
Liquidity or CAMEL (Baral 2005; Kumar, 
Harsha, Anand & Dhruva 2012; Roman & 
Şargu 2013). Each of  these approaches has 
its advantages and disadvantages in provid-
ing accurate information regarding banking 
stability. Albulescu (2010) and Jakubík (2013) 
argue that the current measurements are not 
able to predict the possibility of  banking in-
stability in the future because they only use 
internal factors (the financial ratio), which is 
not enough to predict future banking insta-
bilities.
Borio, Drehmann, and Tsatsaronis 
(2014) mentioned that, given the current tech-
nology and the rapid changes in innovation 
and financial deregulation, stress tests are not 
reliable as an early warning signal. In other 
words, the stress test approach is insufficient, 
as a supervisory tool, for identifying vulner-
abilities during tranquil periods. Further, the 
limitations of  the stress test approach include 
(i) it does not permit comparisons of  the lev-
el of  stability during different periods and (ii) 
it is harder to make comparisons amongst 
individual banking institutions (Albulescu 
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2010). An alternative, the z-score, also has 
several drawbacks. For instance, it may pro-
vide a positive assessment of  the banking 
institutions’ stability due to the manipulation 
of  the reported data by the management (Ci-
hák 2007). Kabir, Worthington, and Gupta 
(2015) highlighted the limitations of  using 
accounting information alone as it might not 
be informative for assessing banking systems 
as the management can manipulate it to in-
crease the value of  their bank’s assets. The 
z-score applied to an individual banking in-
stitution does not consider the correlation of  
institutions in the system, potentially over-
looking the risk that a default in one banking 
institution may cause losses to other banking 
institutions in the system (Cihák & Schaeck 
2010). Dang’s (2011) study mentioned the 
drawbacks of  adopting the CAMELS rating, 
such as the role of  allowances and provision 
for the loan-loss ratio had been overlooked. 
Provision for loan losses and allowances are 
essential to mitigate banks against potential 
risks (Elnahass et al., 2014) therefore, these 
factors need to be considered when evalu-
ating banking performance. Besides, it is an 
internal instrument for analyzing the bank’s 
overall condition based on financial, opera-
tional, and managerial characteristics (Sarker 
2005). Different types of  banks may have a 
distinct focus on the ratios, depending on 
the portfolio characteristics of  the individual 
banks (Cihák & Schaeck 2010). 
Based on these arguments, this study 
proposed the construction of  a Banking Sta-
bility Index (BSI) as an alternative approach 
to banking stability and to improve the exist-
ing model, but not as a replacement for the 
existing approaches, which will provide offi-
cials with a better measurement to see into 
the future and predicate future vulnerabilities 
in banking systems. This will allow them to 
devise a solution for an upcoming crisis, al-
lowing them to have a better and more sta-
ble banking system. BSI is needed for several 
purposes. For instance, BSI is a summary of  
many financial variables (Koop & Korobilis 
2014). BSI offers to make comparisons be-
tween different periods, with different cate-
gories of  banking systems (Albulescu 2010). 
Besides, BSI can capture the level of  stabili-
ty in the banking system (Morris 2011). The 
index approach was based on recommenda-
tions from the literature (IMF 2006; Chaibi 
& Ftiti 2015; Castro 2013; Nkusu 2011; Ali 
& Daly 2010) that have explored indicators 
from the financial and economic perspec-
tives. 
While previous studies (Kashif  et al., 
2016; Baradwaj et al., 2015; Foos et al., 2010; 
Amador et al., 2013) have focused on the ef-
fect of  total credit growth (including both 
business and household loans), this study 
contributes to the existing finance literature 
by providing evidence about the effects of  
household credit only, rather than consider-
ing business credit as well, on banking sta-
bility in developing countries such as Malay-
sia. Given that it is the largest credit source 
for the household sector, the banking sector 
must continually monitor the potential risk 
(Endut & Hua 2009; Abdul Ghani 2010).
This study’s further contribution is the 
empirical examination of  household cred-
it’s effect on banking stability using a total 
household credit to total loan indicator. The 
influence of  household credit on banking 
stability using a Banking Stability Index (BSI) 
has not been previously explored in the lit-
erature. Previous studies have examined 
other variables—for example, Nakornthab 
(2010) investigated problem loans by cal-
culating nonperforming loans (NPLs) and 
loan losses to total loans, while others have 
used household debt to GDP as a proxy of  
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household credit (Sassi & Gasmi 2014; Ber-
isha & Meszaros 2017; Büyükkarabacak & 
Valev 2010). The present study also offers 
a deeper understanding of  the relationship 
between two different credit categories— 
mortgage and consumer credit—rather than 
focusing on overall household credit. In par-
ticular, differences in the credit categories’ 
sensitivities may affect each type of  credit 
differently. According to Morgan and Zhang 
(2017), mortgage credit has a lower risk than 
consumer credit. The property acts as collat-
eral to secure the loan, indicating the banks 
have a lower cost in terms of  capital. Besides, 
different estimations allow the identification 
of  which household credit components, ei-
ther mortgage credit or consumer credit, are 
driving the negative relationship between 
credit and banking stability. Therefore, this 
study distinguished between household cred-
it, mortgage credit, and consumer credit and 
examined each of  these variables separately. 
Literature Review 
Several studies have shown that indebt-
edness is a leading indicator for possible in-
creases in the banking system’s instability 
(Kaminsky & Reinhart 1999; Kraft & Jankov 
2005; Hume & Sentence 2009; Büyükkaraba-
cak & Valev 2010). Freitakas and Mendelso-
nas (2015) found that excessive credit growth 
weakens the balance sheet and increases the 
financial system’s susceptibility to economic 
fluctuations. This can disrupt the financial in-
termediation role of  financial institutions, in-
creasing the financial system’s risk and even-
tually causing a financial crisis. 
Early empirical studies have shown 
that increased lending activity is accompa-
nied by an increase in NPLs and loan loss-
es and a reduction in bank profitability and 
capitalization, ultimately affecting banking 
stability (Sinkey & Greenawalt 1991; Clair 
1992; Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache 1998; 
Kaminsky & Reinhart 1999; Salas & Saurina 
2002; Nkusu 2011; Louzis et al., 2012). Such 
problems have been seen in some credit card 
markets’ boom bust cycles, the rapid house 
price increases in several economies, and the 
ongoing global financial turmoil. The Inter-
national Monetary Fund (2011) has also high-
lighted that in countries with high household 
credit, housing busts and subsequent reces-
sions have resulted in severe and protracted 
contractions in consumption and general 
economic activities, compared to countries 
with low household credit. 
Sinkey and Greenawalt (1991) found 
a positive relationship between past credit 
growth and loan loss rates in US banks from 
1984 to 1987. Similarly, using data on individ-
ual banks in Texas from 1976 to 1990, Clair 
(1992) examined the effect of  credit growth 
on NPLs and loan charge-off  rates in the 
first year after a bank’s credit expansion, find-
ing a somewhat positive relationship in sub-
sequent years. Salas and Saurina (2002) ex-
plored the determinants of  NPLs in Spanish 
commercial and savings banks from 1985 to 
1997, confirming that credit growth in Span-
ish savings banks was significantly associat-
ed with loan losses 3 to 4 years later. Leaven 
and Majnoni (2003) reported similar results 
using Bankscope data for 45 countries, find-
ing a negative and significant contemporane-
ous relation between credit growth and loan 
losses. Other studies (Keeton 1999; Caprio & 
Klingebiel 2003; Cottarelli et al., 2005; Kraft 
& Jankov 2005) have reported that continu-
ous credit growth is one of  the main factors 
associated with problem loans, which may 
lead to future NPLs. 
Kashif  et al., (2016) analyzed panel data 
from 324 banks in Pakistan for the period 
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from 2006 to 2014. The findings support 
those of  previous empirical studies, sug-
gesting that abnormal credit growth during 
lending booms increases the ratio of  NPLs 
to gross advances, and that rapid growth in 
bad loans diminishes the capital ratio, indi-
cating a decrease in bank solvency. In a sim-
ilar study, Baradwaj et al., (2015) examined 
the effect of  a growth in lending on Chinese 
banks’ risk from 1992 to 2007. They found 
that promoting credit growth significant-
ly impacted banking stability, returns, and 
capital adequacy. Growth in lending leads to 
increases in loan loss provisions, interest in-
come, and lower capital ratios. Amador et al., 
(2013) revealed that abnormal credit growth 
for a prolonged period increased the risk to 
banks, accompanied by a reduction in their 
solvency and an increase in the ratio of  NPLs 
to total loans. Foos et al., (2010) presented 
similar findings from a sample of  16 devel-
oped countries from 1997 to 2007, showing 
that credit growth was negatively associated 
with bank solvency because banks may not 
increase their capital proportionally. The dif-
ference between the studies by Foos et al., 
(2010) and Amador et al., (2013) is that the 
former used time-series data, while the latter 
used panel data. Besides, Amador analyzed 
the effects of  abnormal loan growth on fi-
nancial performance during times of  finan-
cial distress. Igan and Pinheiro (2011) used 
a bank-level dataset from banks in 90 coun-
tries from 1995 to 2005. They found a neg-
ative relationship between credit and bank 
soundness during the boom period. Contra-
dicting the above studies, Fenech, Yap, and 
Shafik (2014) argued that the association be-
tween credit growth and the banking system 
was positive and found no evidence to sug-
gest that credit weakens the banking system’s 
soundness. 
To increase their lending volume, indi-
vidual banks may relax their credit standards 
for lower-income borrowers (Kraft & Jankov 
2005). Büyükkarabacak and Valev (2010) ar-
gued that rapid credit growth increases credit 
quality’s deterioration probability, making it 
risky for banks when borrowers have diffi-
culties repaying their debts. 
Such a reduction in credit standards 
increases the chance of  loan defaults and 
causes a credit bubble. When a bank’s lend-
ing rises over a long period, a proportion of  
new loans are extended to borrowers with-
out credit histories or who would have been 
rejected under normal circumstances. This 
may be attributable to inadequate screening 
to verify the ability of  the borrowers to make 
repayments. Eventually, banks experience a 
deterioration of  their loan portfolios, which 
may lead to a banking crisis or collapse.
The association between credit and 
banking stability is unclear, especially when it 
involves the household sector. When analyz-
ing the relationship between credit and bank-
ing stability, previous studies (Kashif  et al., 
2016; Amador 2013; Foos et al., 2010) have 
measured indebtedness by including lending 
to households and businesses. To date, em-
pirical investigations regarding household 
credit are limited, perhaps because of  insuffi-
cient available data (Endut & Hua 2009; Hull 
2003). Freitakas and Mendelsonas (2015) re-
viewed the relationship between household 
credit and financial institutions, concluding 
that a relationship between household cred-
it and financial stability clearly exists but it 
has not been sufficiently researched. Abdul 
Ghani (2010) and Endut and Hua (2009) have 
explained the influence of  household cred-
it on banking stability through comparative 
illustrations and trends; however, their find-
ings were not rooted in an empirical analysis. 
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Given that the volume of  credit has shifted 
from businesses to households, leading to a 
rapid increase in the household debt ratio to 
GDP, it is essential to focus on household 
credit rather than including business credit. 
Based on the argument above, this 
study investigated the effects of  household 
credit on banking stability. Following Büyük-
karabacak and Valev (2010), the hypothe-
sis for this study was that household credit 
has a significant negative impact on banking 
stability. Büyükkarabacak and Valey (2010) 
used household credit to GDP as a proxy 
for household credit, while the present study 
used household credit to total gross loans at 
the institutional banking level.
Methods
Data on 37 Malaysian banks were col-
lected from the Bankscope and IMF databas-
es. The sample period was limited to eight 
years (2008 to 2015) because of  the limita-
tion that not all banks, particularly foreign 
banks, provide all credit facilities (e.g., cred-
it cards, personal loans, or hire purchase) to 
households. 
Construction of  the banking stability 
index
The construction of  a BSI involved two 
main processes—selecting the variables fol-
lowed by their transformation using empiri-
cal normalization—before the variance-equal 
weight method could be applied (Morales & 
Estrada 2010; Illing & Liu 2006). 
The selection of  variables was crucial 
because they represent conditions that may 
underpin the threats to banking stability 
(Hakkio & Keeton 2009). Hence, the vari-
ables used should cover all the banking sys-
tem’s determinants (Baselga-Pascual et al., 
2015). In general, banking stability depends 
on both internal and external factors (Creel 
et al., 2014; Baselga-Pascual et al., 2015). In-
ternal factors refer to bank-specific variables 
(Salas & Saurina 2002; Louzis et al., 2012) 
as the potential determinants of  banking 
stability, while external factors refer to mac-
ro-economic variables (Zouari-ghorbel et al., 
2014; Castro 2013) which highlight changes 
to the economic conditions that affect bank-
ing stability. There is an argument about the 
banking systems’ fragility, which is not from 
the banks themselves, but depends on the 
external factors, i.e., the macro-economic 
performance. For instance, in the case of  the 
subprime mortgage crisis of  2008, this af-
fected the entire banking system through the 
macro-economic factors (De Jonghe 2010). 
In addition, the IMF and World Bank sug-
gest that the measurement should shift from 
a micro-prudential (bank-specific factors) to 
a macro-prudential (macroeconomic factors) 
framework. All the variables were grouped 
into two sub-indexes, namely the Banking In-
dex (BI) for bank-specific variables and the 
Banking Vulnerability Index (BVI) for mac-
ro-economic variables. Appendix A presents 
the summary of  the selection of  variables to 
construct the BSI.
The current study used the IMF’s Fi-
nancial Soundness Indicators framework, as 
recommended by the IMF’s Financial Sound-
ness Indicators: Compilation Guide (2006) 
and previous literature (Chaibi & Ftiti 2015; 
Castro 2013; Nkusu 2011; Ali & Daly 2010). 
The selection of  variables followed the IMF’s 
Financial Soundness Indicators (FSI) (IMF 
2006) framework because they have the fol-
lowing criteria. Firstly, the IMF indicators 
were designed for international comparisons 
across countries so that other countries can 
use the same methodology (IMF 2006). Sec-
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ondly, the indicators have been used by the 
IMF member countries, including Malaysia. 
Hence they were believed to provide an in-
sight into banking’s health and soundness 
(Cihák & Schaeck 2010). However, the selec-
tion of  variables was adapted to Malaysia’s lo-
cal economic conditions, to include the entire 
banking system’s determinants. 
Next, in constructing the indices, the 
aggregation method (or weighting) is essen-
tial because of  the resulting index’s ability to 
reflect banking stability. In previous studies, 
various aggregation methods have been ap-
plied, including the variance-equal weights 
method, in which all the variables are given 
the same weight (Balakrishnan et al., 2011; 
Cardarelli et al., 2011; Hanschel & Monnin 
2005; Illing & Liu 2006; Puddu 2013), aggre-
gation schemes based on expert judgment 
and experience (Gersl & Hermanek 2010), 
principal components analysis (Cevik et al., 
2013; Hakkio & Keeton 2009; Illing & Liu 
2006) and the logit model (Grimaldi 2010; 
Nelson & Perli 2007). This study employed 
the variance-equal weights method because it 
provides better goodness of  fit for complex 
methodologies and allows for a cross-coun-
try comparison (Morales & Estrada 2010). 
Further, this method has been suggested for 
studies with highly correlated variables (Pop-
ovska 2014). In this context, each variable 
was given the same weight of  0.5. The fol-
lowing equations were used:
To calculate the indices, all the indicators 
were assigned the same weight.
where w1+w2=1..
Following the index’s construction, the next 
step was to conduct an empirical estimation 
of  the relationship between the different 
types of  credit and banking stability in each 
banking category. The baseline model was as 
follows:
where i represents banks, t denotes the peri-
od from 2008 to 2015 (t = 8), β0 is the con-
stant of  the model, ε(i,t) is the error term, c 
denotes all three types of  credit, hc denotes 
household credit, mc is mortgage credit, and 
cc is consumer credit. This study proposes 
three control variables, namely bank assets 
(dsize), bank leverage (lev), and manage-
ment efficiency (mgmt) (refer to appendix 
B). Bank assets are defined as the log of  the 
total assets of  the banks (Sufian 2009). Bank 
assets can be used as a measure of  banking 
stability because this variable reflects the fi-
nancial strength of  a bank (Morgan & Zhang 
2017). The leverage ratio is calculated by the 
proportion of  total liabilities divided by to-
tal assets. Higher leverage ratios also mean 
that banks have enough funds to make future 
investments and gain more profits. Manage-
ment efficiency is measured using the cost 
to-income ratio (De Jonghe 2010; Kabir et 
al., 2015; Muhmad & Hashim 2015). In the 
present study, the cost-to-income ratio re-
flects management efficiency by measuring 
the cost of  running the bank, such as salaries 
as a percentage of  generated income. The 
growth and success of  banking institutions 
depend on efficient management practices to 
detect, monitor, and control risk exposures, 
ensuring the safety and efficiency of  the 
banks’ activities (De Jonghe 2010).
Panel data estimation
This study did not use the GMM model 
because the GMM approach would shorten 
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the sample size by at least two waves. Due to 
the short series and relatively few banks in 
the panel, the GMM approach would mean 
a severe reduction in the sample size. More-
over, this study used indices systems such as 
the dependent variables (the value of  the in-
dices is between zero and one), which cause 
the results to be less significant. Thus, this 
study used the static linear panel data model. 
First, this study used the Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrange multiplier test to distinguish be-
tween the pooled and random-effects mod-
els. The null hypothesis for the Breusch– 
Pagan Lagrange multiplier test was pooled 
ordinary least squares regression, while the 
alternate hypothesis was the random-effects 
model. The p-value for the Breusch–Pagan 
Lagrange multiplier test was 0.001. Hence, 
the random-effects model was more appro-
priate than the pooled model. 
Second, this study used the Hausman 
specification test to assess whether the fixed 
effects or the random-effects model was 
more suitable. The null hypothesis (H0) for 
the Hausman specification test was the ran-
dom-effects model, while the alternate hy-
pothesis was the fixed effect model. The 
p-value for the Hausman specification test 
was 0.001. Because the p-value was less than 
0.05, the null hypothesis (H0) was rejected. 
This result indicates that the random-effects 
model was not appropriate and, therefore, the 
fixed-effects model specification was prefer-
able. 
Next, to verify the reliability of  the re-
gression model, diagnostic tests for multicol-
linearity, heteroscedasticity, and autocorrela-
tion were performed. Multicollinearity was 
assessed using Pearson’s correlation coeffi-
cient, with the variance inflation factor con-
firming that there were no multicollinearity 
issues in this model. White’s method was used 
to determine the existence of  heteroscedas-
ticity, with results indicating that the model 
had a heteroscedasticity problem. Thus, to at-
tain optimal results, this study applied robust 
regression techniques to control for hetero-
scedasticity and serial correlation in the data-
set.
Results
The relationship between household 
credit and banking stability
After eliminating the outliers, the to-
tal number of  observations (as identified by 
Cook’s distance) was 293. As shown in Table 
1, household credit’s coefficient was signifi-
cantly negative at the 1% level for individual 
bank-level variables. The negative relation-
ship between household credit and banking 
stability is consistent with the proposition 
that credit growth leads to an overall decline 
in bank health. The coefficient of  household 
credit was in the hypothesized direction and 
in accordance with Hyman Minsky’s theory 
(1992) on the importance of  the margin of  
safety, because banks with sustained periods 
of  credit growth frequently take higher risks 
and eventually experience loan portfolio de-
terioration. Similarly, Kashif  et al., (2016), 
Amador et al., (2013), and Foos et al., (2010) 
found a negative relationship between credit 
growth and banking stability. During periods 
of  credit expansion, banks are more likely to 
expand their total credit volume to relatively 
low-quality borrowers (Kraft & Jankov 2005). 
Thus, risky loans are being approved, leading 
to an increasing number of  potential defaults. 
Decisions to expand or reduce lending activ-
ities may compromise the soundness of  the 
banking system. 
Extensive lending activities ultimately 
lead to the possibility of  default payments and 
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thus higher loan losses in the future (Sinkey 
& Greenawalt 1991; Clair 1992; Cottarelli et 
al., 2005; Kraft & Jankov 2005). Default pay-
ments do not begin immediately after new 
loans are granted. Salas and Saurina (2002) 
found that credit growth is significantly and 
positively associated with loan losses 3 to 4 
years ahead, while Foos et al., (2010) found 
that credit growth influences subsequent loan 
losses with a lag of  2 to 4 years. However, 
these studies used total credit (household and 
business) in their analysis and did not focus 
on household credit alone. 
The relationship between mortgage 
credit and banking stability
As shown in Table 1, the coefficient 
of  mortgage credit was negatively related to 
banking stability at a significance level of  1%. 
The coefficient of  mortgage credit support-
ed this study’s hypothesis, which was based 
on the argument that mortgage credit in-
volves a longer period and is highly sensitive 
to house price fluctuations, in line with the 
study by Morgan and Zhang (2017). Accord-
ing to Minsky’s financial instability hypothe-
sis, higher credit may pose a higher financial 
risk during economic booms when banks 
overextend their balance sheets by offering 
higher lending to households and lowering 
their credit standards, which destabilizing the 
financial system. 
The findings are also validated by Tajik et 
al., (2015), who found that the risks to which 
banks are exposed are susceptible to house 
price fluctuations. Nakornthab (2010) and Ta-
jik et al., (2015) posit that house price move-
ment is one factor forcing households into 
debt because changes in house prices have 
direct effects on household wealth. Howev-
er, a sharp fall in property prices can lead to 
banking instability and weaken the economy 
as housing construction slows, triggering fi-
nancial strain and default payments. Further, 
increased unemployment rates result in NPLs 
and default payments among households, 
leading to a rapid worsening of  banks’ balance 
sheets. Periods of  mortgage credit are often 
linked with economic factors such as GDP, in-
terest rates, and inflation (Debelle 2004; Meng 
et al., 2013; Dinh, Mullineux & Muriu 2012; 
Howard, Lewis-Bynoe & Moore 2011). 




Model A: HC Model B: MC Model C: CC
Household credit −0.0076 (−4.52 ***) 
Mortgage credit −0.0121 (−4.42***)
Consumer credit −0.0172 (−3.89***)
Leverage 0.0464 (1.54) 0.0434 (1.46) 0.0501 (1.61)
Bank asset −0.0721 (−10.91***) −0.0713 (−11.00***) −0.0732 (−10.74***)
Management efficiency −0.0312 (−0.95) −0.0302 (−0.91) −0.0329 (−1.01)
Constant 0.9933 (13.14***) 0.9872 (13.35***) 1.0027 (12.89***)
R-squared 0.4273 0.4269 0.4276
F-statistic 46.77*** 56.13*** 43.57***
Observations 293 293 293
Notes: *Indicates significance at the 10% level; **Indicates significance at the 5% level; ***Indicates significance 
at the 1% level. The baseline model in Equation (4) is estimated using fixed-effects with robust standard error.
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The impact of  mortgage credit on 
banking health depends on the quality of  the 
loan portfolios (Salas & Saurina 2002), with 
risky borrowers causing banks to suffer from 
high loan losses during periods of  economic 
shock. Aligned with International Monetary 
Fund (2011) findings, mortgage credit has 
a negative relationship with banking stabili-
ty. The explanatory power of  the results on 
mortgage credit was approximately 42.7%, 
with two variables having significant effects 
on banking stability at a significance level of  
1%.
The relationship between consumer 
credit and banking stability
The results presented in Table 1 show 
that the estimated coefficient of  consumer 
credit with banking stability was negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, indi-
cating that an increase in consumer credit will 
reduce banks’ stability. This result is similar 
to that found in the first two models. 
Consumer credit is often associated with 
consumption and maintaining one’s lifestyle. 
During boom periods, competition among 
bankers to offer instant cash, balance trans-
fers, cashback, and discounts (Baradwaj et al., 
2015) is high. During economic crises, falls in 
income and asset prices lead to the inability 
to repay debt, particularly when interest rates 
are higher. 
Discussion on the regression results of  
control variables
Three control variables were used in 
this study: bank assets, bank leverage, and 
management efficiency. Regarding the con-
trol variables, this study found no difference 
between a mortgage and consumer credit; 
therefore, combining these variables is sug-
gested. Bank assets were negatively associat-
ed with banking stability for all the models 
(household, mortgage, and consumer credit). 
The coefficients were high in the estimation, 
indicating that bank assets were significant at 
the 1% level for all models. The results sug-
gest that the larger the bank, the greater its 
access is to capital markets and the higher the 
risk (Kashif  et al., 2016).
The positive relationship between bank 
leverage and banking stability appeared for 
all models and was consistent with previous 
studies’ findings (Amador et al., 2013; Louzis 
et al., 2012). High leverage may lead to high-
er banking stability because of  funds to in-
crease banks’ returns and liquidity. Louzis et 
al., (2012) claimed that this effect occurs only 
up to a certain size threshold, above which 
leverage has no statistically significant effect 
on banking stability. However, leverage is not 
a significant factor for household, mortgage, 
and consumer credit (Ahmad & Arif  2007). 
Management efficiency was negative and in-
significant in determining banking stability 
for all types of  credit. The present study’s 
findings suggest that management efficiency 
plays no significant role in banking stability. 
Summary and Conclusions
This study provides new empirical evi-
dence on the relationship between household 
credit and the Banking Stability Index (BSI) 
in Malaysia using bank-level data. In examin-
ing the role of  both consumer and mortgage 
credit on bank stability using static panel es-
timation, the main findings show that house-
hold credit had a significant negative effect 
on banking stability. The results were similar 
for the sub-component of  household credit, 
namely mortgage and consumer credit. Ac-
cording to Meng (2014), each type of  credit 
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has a different collateral and tenure period 
and carries different risks to banking health, 
influencing banking stability in the future. 
This study’s results can be used as an 
early warning signal for the policymakers 
to formulate strategies and policies for 
promoting an effective and sound banking 
system and prevent it from going into 
financially distressed situations due to 
excessive debt. This study’s findings also give 
an overview of  other countries plagued with 
escalating household debts to GDP. Some 
of  the suggestions to improve the policy 
imperatives for banks include building an 
individual credit system through creating 
credit records for customers, by combining 
all the potential borrower’s debts either from 
banks or non-bank lenders (Court Mammort, 
cooperative loans, AEON Credit Services 
and Singer Sdn. Bhd., which also provide 
financing options for in-store items). From 
this, the management team would assess an 
individual’s financial condition by tracking 
his/her historical borrowing records. This 
effort is to gauge borrowers’ credit worthiness 
and minimize the default payment risk to 
the banking sector. Currently, the Malaysia 
Central Credit Reference Information System 
(CCRIS) does not include the nonbank 
lenders.
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLES IN BSI
Variables Definition Acronym Previous Literature
Banking Index (BI)
Capital adequacy ratio Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets
Regulatory tier I capital to risk-weighted assets 







Asset quality ratio Nonperforming loans to total gross loans NPL Cheang & Choy 
(2010)
Liquidity ratio Liquid assets to total assets
Liquid assets to short term liabilities
LATA
LAST
Morris (2010) Gersl & 
Hermanek (2010)
Profitability ratio Return on assets
Return on equity
Interest margin-to-gross income ratio






Morales & Estrada 
(2010)
Banking Vulnerability Index (BVI)
External factor Current account balance to GDP ratio




Real sector Inflation rate





Uhde & Heimeshoff  
(2009) 
(Source: IMF 2006: Compilation Guide and previous literature)
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APPENDIX B: SUMMARY OF VARIABLES
Notation Definition Sources Expected 
sign
BSI Indices consist of  capital, assets, profitability, liquidity, 
GDP, inflation, and interest rate
Bankscope, 
World Bank
Household credit Household loan/ total gross loan. Bankscope 
Annual report
-
Mortgage credit Mortgage loan divided by the total gross loan offer 




Consumer credit A consumer loan is divided by the total gross loan 




Bank asset The logarithm of  total assets of  the banks Bankscope -
Leverage Total liabilities/total assets Bankscope +
Management effi-
ciency
Total operating cost/total operating income Bankscope -
